Almost an outing. For many, the wars of invasion waged by fascist Italy in Africa, where we would ‘take the streets’ as so many nostalgic people say, or those in the former Yugoslavia or Greece, to name but a few, would have been a far cry from the Nazi wars. But is this really the case? Is the good Italian and the bad German true or is it a myth? Did Italy have war criminals? And how much did the lack of an Italian Nuremberg weigh on the crimes of fascism? We talked about this with Filippo Focardi, professor at the University of Padua and author of numerous books and research papers on the subject.

QUESTION BERTOLUCCI: Professor, was it really the bad German and the good Italian or did we remove our guilt during the Second World War?

FOCARDI ANSWER: There is no doubt that the German armed forces, both the regular ones, the wehrmacht and the SS, committed atrocious crimes, both in the war of the axis so to speak from 39 to 43 and then also during the Italian occupation. Suffice it to recall the great massacres of civilians such as Sant’Anna di Stazzema or Monte Sole. Women and children were also slaughtered there. So this obviously took place in an even more massive form in Eastern Europe, in Central and Eastern Europe, think of Poland think of the war of annihilation against the Soviet Union, obviously the Shoah. So there is no doubt that on the shoulders of Germany, of the Germans, weighs this very serious stain of having committed enormous war crimes. This image of the German villain, which therefore has, so to speak, a very, very substantial fund of truth, was however used by Italy, by the ruling class, first the monarchy, Badoglio, then also by the anti-fascist ruling class, by everyone, from liberals to communists, to paint a benevolent, self-exonerating image of the Italians in contrast to Germany and the Germans. Because in the years of the Axis war precisely fought by Fascist Italy alongside Hitler’s Germany, from 1940 to 1943, serious war crimes were also committed on the Italian side, especially in the Balkans.Therefore, in the occupied territories of Yugoslavia and Greece, and partly in the Soviet Union, war crimes that were not, let’s say, at the peak of the monstrosity reached by Germany, especially not by the Italians, mass crimes of ethnic cleansing, genocide, such as the extermination of the Jews or the Roma, the Sinti, perpetrated by the Germans, were not perpetrated. But they had been very serious war crimes, repressive actions against the partisan movement, but they had hit not only partisans in arms, whether men or women, but also civilians. Hence round-ups, the shooting of hostages, the creation of a system of Italian concentration camps for Yugoslavs, but also for Greeks and where tens of thousands of people were put. Here this face of Italy in the war, of the crimes committed by the Italians, was deliberately obscured through the use of the comparison with the German villain and through rather emphasising the humanitarian merits of the Italians. The Germans were implacable, steeped in anti-Semitic hatred and did everything they did. Compared to them, we Italians behaved in a diametrically opposed manner: our soldiers did not want Mussolini’s war, they were, let’s say, not fascists inside, they had humanitarian solidarity attitudes towards the civilian population, starting with the Jews; we saved the Jews, instead the German comrades wanted to exterminate them. This is interesting, because there is some truth to it, because in fact for various reasons, not only for humanitarian reasons but also for political reasons, for reasons that sometimes even made us pay, the latest studies have shown that there was a price scale, that is, we saved many Jews in many cases by making us pay. But beyond this the outcome was undoubtedly that the Italians, the Italian occupation forces, those same occupation forces that shot Slovenian or Croatian partisans, saved thousands of Jews. So there is a kernel of truth in this distinction-contraposition between the bad German image and the good Italian image. At the same time, this served precisely to spread a blanket of fog over Italian crimes. And it was a diplomatic card chosen, initially chosen by the Foreign Ministry apparatuses that remained with Badoglio and also by the Italian military to respond to the accusations of war, of war crimes, that were being made by the occupied countries, Yugoslavia and Greece, already in the autumn of 1943 a United Nations commission for war crimes was to be set up in London, which was to draw up lists of the war criminals of the Axis powers, including Italy, and then after the war they would have to end up before a court to be tried as war criminals. That was to say to protect Italians who had committed war crimes, accused of war crimes, on the one hand and also to as in absolve the country. There was not only a personal discourse of war criminals, there was also a national discourse of national interest to absolve the country of Mussolini’s war and, let’s say, to promote in the future a non-punitive peace for Italy, this narrative was constructed, whereby the Italians were good and good Samaritans compared to the bad Germans. So from this discourse you don’t have to judge us on a par with Germany, Italy was defeated Mussolini’s Italy. No, it had been defeated it signed a September armistice and 43 came out of the war as a defeated enemy nation subject to unconditional surrender. But the speech was this: you must not judge us and treat us like the Germans and Germany because we, even when we were allied with Hitler’s Germany, behaved completely differently from our German comrade. We saved the Jews, they exterminated them. True, there is a kernel of truth there, but all this was to obscure instead the serious war crimes committed by the Italian side and the responsibility of Mussolini’s Italy in the Axis war.

QUESTION BERTOLUCCI: so there are also many Italian war criminals who have gone unpunished I guess, or not?

FOCARDI ANSWER: Yes, almost all of them went unpunished. Because in the lists of the United Nations commission for war criminals, there were at least a thousand Italian civilians and military personnel accused of war crimes against civilians in the occupied territories, mainly Yugoslavia and Greece, then there was another category of war criminals which were those Italians who had committed violence and killings against allied prisoners of war. The only category of Italian war criminals to have ended up before the Tribunal to have also been tried and punished were those who had committed war crimes against British American or Commonwealth prisoners of war. So British prisoners killed while trying to escape from a camp in Apulia an internment camp. There, after the war, many trials were held, mainly on the British side, and there are also a few, but some death sentences against Italians carried out. The most famous example is that of General Bellomo who was sentenced to death and shot. Sentenced to death by a British court and shot in the late summer of 1945, by the way, this General Bellomo had great merits in the fight against the Germans. In the aftermath of the armistice he had defended the port, I don’t remember whether Bari or Brindisi, but in short he had played an important role. But he had previously been accused of killing a British prisoner of war and he ended up like that. But all the others, that is to say, the thousand or so soldiers, mostly soldiers, but there were also civilians, Italians accused of war crimes for crimes committed against civilians in Yugoslavia in Greece, but some also for Ethiopia, Badoglio and Graziani had been accused by Ethiopia, for example, they got away with it completely. They were not judged they were not arrested and extradited as was provided for by international agreements, attention this is a very important point. Because Article 29 of the so-called long armistice, Italy signed two armistices, the short one and the long one. The short one is the one signed on 3 September. The long one is the one signed on 29 September. Article 29 of the long armistice provided precisely, obliged Italy to hand over Mussolini and all the other war criminals to the allied forces, something that would also be taken up by the Peace Treaty, Article 45 of the Peace Treaty signed in February ‘47. These international obligations, were not fulfilled by Italy, by the governments of at that point we are talking about the anti-fascist government of national unity, which had claimed the position. They had claimed the position of: we judge our criminals in the war. That is, we do not extradite them as provided for in the agreements because we are not the Italy of Mussolini. We are Italy, the new democratic anti-fascist Italy, we claim the right to judge them. This very much clashed with the armistice and then the peace treaty, but the Italian governments let’s say they had room for manoeuvre, especially those who granted them this manoeuvring image: obviously the British and American allied occupying powers. For a long time it was thought and said that it was the British who had protected the Italian war criminals. Certainly the British had an interest in protecting e.g. Badoglio who had signed the armistice. But in reality it was more the Americans. Because for a long time the British actually had in mind to punish Italian war criminals. Not only those who committed crimes against their prisoners of war but also those who committed crimes in Yugoslavia rather than in Greece. In reality, the American position changed very quickly in favour of Italy. This happened later, in May June 1945 after the war had just ended. After the transitional Yugoslav occupation of Trieste and Venezia Giulia. Which were occupied from May to about the middle of June 1945. At that point with respect to a threat, how to say communist, of Tito’s Yugoslavia on Italy, and also to the news about the Foibe, therefore about crimes committed against Italians, the American position immediately stiffened. Yugoslavia was Italy’s main accuser because out of those one thousand war criminals on the UN lists, 750 were accused by Yugoslavia. Here Yugoslavia appeared in the eyes of the Americans simply at that moment in ‘45, as a pawn. The Americans stiffened immediately and since the Allied government in Italy was an Anglo-American government, who was to arrest the Italians and extradite them? The Allied military authorities. That they were British and American together. The moment the Americans get in the way in ‘45, the machine gets stuck. It is somehow not possible to proceed to locating, arresting and extraditing Italian war criminals, either to Belgrade or Athens. Here, the Italian government can enjoy a margin of manoeuvre that actually allows it to go against the dictate of the armistice to understand itself. And there among the criminals of war demands Yugoslavia there were big names. First of all Mario Roatta, commander of the Second Army in Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia. He was number one on the list of war criminals, according to Yugoslavia. He had remained chief and general staff of the army with Badoglio among others. Another war criminal was Vittorio Ambrosio, also a former second army commander of Yugoslavia, even chief of staff of the armed forces under Badoglio. In fact, this news created a scandal in ‘43, that the top military leadership of Badoglio’s government was entrusted to two war criminals under Yugoslavia and there were also very vocal protests in the British Parliament so much so that at least Ambrosio and Roatta had to resign. They were not handed over to anyone they got away with, but at least they were forced to give up their positions. So Italy nobody was extradited, but Italy had said I’ll judge them, I’ll take care of my own. And it had started to do something. It set up a commission of enquiry at the Ministry of War that was to examine the position of the alleged, let’s call them, Italian war criminals. In fact, more than 300 positions were examined and in the end, a list was made of 40 or so people, mainly military personnel but also governors of Dalmatia, etc., who were considered war criminals. That is to say, against whom evidence had been collected on the Italian side to prove that these actually had not behaved well, had not been saintly and therefore had to be brought to trial. These included the already named Mario Roatta and Alessandro Pirzio Biroli, governor of Montenegro, and many others. And then did we do these trials? We did not do them. We never did them because there is an important aspect to consider. In June 1948, Tito broke with Stalin, so Yugoslavia’s main accuser had the international support of the Soviet Union. This was also due to the issue of war criminals. The break with the Soviet Union meant that Yugoslavia no longer had any international support. On the contrary it needs Western support at this point. It also needs to re-establish good ties with Italy in perspective. And so from that point on there is no pressure from the Yugoslav side to judge the Italian war criminals. However, it is interesting that there is a whole correspondence between the Italian government, the De Gasperi government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry also of War, then of Defence, because Yugoslavia no longer wants to try anyone. But we have committed ourselves to try them, we have done the investigations, everything is ready to do the trials. How is it done? That is, from a legal point of view we have to try them. So there is a brilliant idea there, let’s say from the defence lawyers of these alleged Italian war criminals, if you like, who say ‘well there is an article in the penal code of war, Article 165, which conditions the possibility of trying Italian citizens for war crimes on reciprocity’. That is, I try my own people who have committed crimes in a given country, if that country tries its citizens who have committed crimes against Italian citizens. That country is Yugoslavia and here reference is made to what? To the crimes of the Foibe. So I, the Italian government, it was the military prosecutor’s office that had to do the trial, the military prosecutor’s office, try mine if Yugoslavia also tries its citizens for the Foibe. Obviously it was not in heaven or on earth. That is, it was not that Tito tried his closest collaborators for the Foibe. So on the basis of that article in 1951, June 1951, all investigations against Italian war criminals, made by the Italian side that should have resulted in criminal proceedings, are cancelled. They are blocked, archived and nothing is done. This is obviously interesting because there is a very close connection between the Foibe issue and the issue of Italian war crimes. In 2008, someone tried to bring the matter up again because a former military magistrate, Sergio Dini, wrote a letter, an exposé to the Council of Military Magistracy, referring precisely to the fact that Article 165 on reciprocity, which had blocked everything, no longer existed because the code had been reformed in 2002. And so there was the possibility, in his opinion, indeed the ethical duty, to hold trials against Italian war criminals. As a matter of fact, even there, the military prosecutor Antonino Intelisano, who was the same prosecutor who had done the trial against Priebke ten years earlier, i.e. the trial against the German war criminal, opened an enquiry against unknown persons. But let us say an investigation with some particular characteristics. In the sense that, as a charge, Article 185 was not used, which is the one that allows giving life imprisonment to those who have committed war crimes, which is the article they used against German war criminals, e.g. Kappler, Reder, etc.. But other articles of the military code were used, such as excessive retaliation. So not a war crime, extermination, but things for which two or three years in prison was the limit. Apart from this then what did Intelisano do? He took up the list of war criminals drawn up by the Italian commission in ‘48, to understand, and that obviously contained names of people who were let’s say in top positions at that time. So people who were already in their 50s then. And he found, as was to be expected, that they were all already dead in their 70s and 80s, so he said ‘Well there’s nobody alive, I’m closing the investigation’ and he closed it. And so nothing came of it.

QUESTION BERTOLUCCI: Aside from I imagine the unbalanced balance between Italian war crimes and the foibe, if only because of the years of occupation carried out by Italy, how much has this lack of Italian Nuremberg also weighed in the perception we have today of fascism?

RESPONSE FOCARDI: In my opinion it weighed heavily. Because it is clear that it is a confrontation in the courtroom, with important defendants, just think if there had been a real trial against Marshal Graziani for the crimes committed in Ethiopia in that case or against Badoglio or against Mario Roatta. These are events, also media events, that inevitably involve society. That is, they force the country to come to terms with them. This obviously happened for Germany, it happened for Japan, among other things two great allies of Italy, there is the Tokyo trial, but it is not only, mind you, it is not only the great Nuremberg or Tokyo trials, it is also the thousands of trials that have been held against German war criminals, against Japanese war criminals. In Italy this has happened. But even Italy stands out in this compared to a country like France. Which was certainly occupied by the Nazis, but had the collaborationist Vichy regime. In France in the 1980s and 1990s, major trials were held against French collaborationists involved in the Shoah. Like Maurice Papon, a piece de resistance, Vichy official but then Gaullist minister, chief of police in Paris, was tried and sentenced to several years in prison. That trial there, if I remember correctly in the mid-1990s, as it were forced the French to reopen that chapter, to confront that history of theirs. Here in Italy, we didn’t have it and we won’t have it now of course. So this has weighed, has weighed heavily in pandering to public opinion with a sweetened, do-gooder image of fascism. Rose-water regime, the good Italians who are only saviours of Jews…it weighed heavily, in my opinion.